If you find a real, exploitable issue on a DDactic-operated surface (excluding the deliberately vulnerable demo target at challenge.ddactic.net), please report it privately first.
Please do not test customer dashboards or production APIs without coordinating first. challenge.ddactic.net is fair game and intentionally vulnerable.
Machine-readable disclosure policy: /.well-known/security.txt
app.ddactic.net, ddactic.net)HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax cookies/api/auth/magic-guest): per-IP rate limit, 16+ char crypto-random tokens, format-validated before KV lookup, separate buckets for valid vs invalid attemptsorganizationId at issuance; downstream API calls scope by sessionapi.ddactic.net): UFW restricts port 8080 to Cloudflare IPs onlychallenge.ddactic.net)/admin, fake admin keys at /api/v1/users, GraphQL introspection, CORS *) — this is the scanner's target, by design[DEMO TARGET]ssh.ddactic.net), key-based, password auth disabledSecureString; tokens.env fallback for local devThe honest list. Things we know are table stakes for enterprise procurement and are sequenced for the next few releases.
single_use (link dies after first click, prevents forwarding) and require_passkey (mandatory device enrollment before results render).Thanks to security researchers and CISOs who have reported issues responsibly. Listed with their permission only.