DDactic Research · October 2026

Industry DDoS Downtime Cost ×
Compliance Requirement × IL Sector Standing

A correlation matrix mapping what each industry loses per hour of DDoS-induced downtime, what their compliance framework actually mandates for DDoS controls, and where Israeli sectors currently stand, measured by DDactic's OPI across their full public attack surface.

OPI 65+ (strong)
OPI 50–65 (moderate)
OPI <50 (exposed)
Method. Every IL figure shows two numbers: Detected is the OPI score computed directly from passive recon -- certificate-transparency discovery, port scan, and CDN/WAF/ASN fingerprinting across every discovered subdomain (OPI v1.1.0). Est. upper assumes that on-demand scrubbing contracts, ISP-native Arbor-backed protection, and on-prem DDoS appliances exist but are not passively observable (on-demand scrubbing only activates under attack; ISP scrubbing stays in the ISP's own ASN). Detected is a confirmed lower bound. Estimated upper is the plausible ceiling for regulated sectors -- it cannot be validated without active simulation. Scores reflect web-facing surface only; figures are sector samples, not exhaustive.
Industry Downtime Cost / hr Compliance Standard DDoS-Specific Clause Global OPI Range IL Sector OPI — Detected / Est. upper Blog Angle / Gap
Regulated Financial
Banking & Capital Markets
Major IL banks & capital markets
up to $9.3M/hr
ITIC 2024 (large banks, high-load trading). 41% of enterprises: $1M–$5M/hr
DORA Art. 24 PCI DSS 4.0 R6.4 NIS2 Art. 21 BoI Dir. 361
DORA Art. 24 mandates TLPT (threat-led pen testing) covering DDoS resilience scenarios. PCI DSS 4.0 R6.4 requires WAF + DAST for all web-facing CHD apps.

Gap: DORA auditors accept "has scrubbing contract" without ever running a test.
Global benchmark
65 – 80
Detected (passive)
19 – 31
→
Est. upper bound
30 – 48
On-demand scrubbing and ISP Arbor-backed protection not passively visible. Subdomain surface exposure confirmed regardless.
Enterprise WAF/scrubbing on primary domains, but 97–100% of the discovered subdomain surface had no protection detected. The long tail is the real attack vector.
DDactic passive scan Aug 2026 · OPI v1.1.0
DORA says "test your ICT resilience." IL banks with EU branches are in scope from Jan 2025. Most have scrubbing contracts but no simulation data to prove they work.
DORA compliance ≠ DDoS resilience
Insurance
Major IL insurers
$1M – $5M
Estimated from ITIC 2024 enterprise median; no insurance-specific study found
DORA Art. 24 NIS2 Art. 21 Solvency II
DORA covers insurance (Directive 2022/2555 Annex lists insurers). EIOPA Guidelines on ICT Security and Governance require operational resilience testing. No DDoS-specific test frequency defined.

Gap: EIOPA guidance references "stress tests" but DDoS simulation is not enumerated.
Estimated (no dedicated benchmark)
60 – 75 (est.)
Detected (passive)
24 – 35
→
Est. upper bound
35 – 50
On-demand scrubbing on primary portal not passively observable.
Enterprise CDN/WAF on primary portals; 85–90% of the surface had no protection detected. Long-tail exposure mirrors banking.
DDactic passive scan Aug 2026 · OPI v1.1.0
Insurance companies file claims 24/7 via portals. A DDoS attack during a disaster event (flood, terror attack) doubles the reputational damage. DORA puts them on the hook but the test requirement is vague.
Worst-time DDoS: attack during the claim event
Critical Infrastructure
Telecommunications
Major IL telecoms
~$2.2M/hr
ITIC 2024; telecoms among highest-impact industries in hourly outage cost
NIS2 Art. 21 + Ann. I EECC MOC Circular
NIS2 Annex I explicitly lists telecoms as key sector. Art. 21(2)(b): "handling of incidents" including DDoS. BEREC Net Neutrality guidelines reference volumetric attack resilience obligations.

Gap: NIS2 requires incident reporting, not proactive testing.
Estimated
60 – 75 (est.)
Detected (passive)
21 – 25
→
Est. upper bound
28 – 42
Telecoms own the Arbor backbone but their own IT portals run on standard hosting. ISP-native scrubbing helps the carrier network, not the web surface.
Enterprise CDN on primary portals; 89–94% of the surface had no protection detected. Providers sell DDoS scrubbing to clients while their own IT surface stays exposed.
DDactic passive scan Aug 2026 · OPI v1.1.0
The irony: telecoms sell DDoS scrubbing to their enterprise customers, but their own billing portals and B2B APIs run without equivalent protection. L4 expertise doesn't transfer to L7.
Providers protect clients, not themselves
Energy / Water
IL power, water & fuel
No clean figure
Grid blackout ($B scale) is a different event. Portal/IT DDoS cost: no sector-specific study found. Physical vs. IT layers not separated in research.
NIS2 Art. 21 EU CER Directive INCD CIP
NIS2 Art. 21(2) includes energy and water as essential entities. EU CER Directive Art. 13 requires stress tests of critical infrastructure. INCD Critical Infrastructure Protection directive mandates availability controls.

Gap: IL INCD requires incident reporting, not simulation tests. No frequency defined.
Estimated range
25 – 45
Not in published benchmarks -- estimated from scan data and sector characteristics. OT budget dominates; IT-layer DDoS routinely underfunded.
Detected (passive)
24 – 56
→
Est. upper bound
35 – 62
INCD-mandated contracts may include on-prem appliances not visible from outside.
Core grid, water and fuel portals run 5–22% CDN coverage; the best-covered player reaches ~74% with an active vendor contract. OT security budgets rarely extend to the IT-layer surface.
DDactic passive scan Oct 2026 · OPI v1.1.0
OT/SCADA security dominates budget. IT-layer DDoS against public-facing portals (smart grid dashboards, outage maps, customer billing) is routinely overlooked. A customer portal DDoS during a blackout crisis doubles public panic.
OT budget blinds them to IT-layer exposure
Digital & Commercial
E-Commerce / Retail
Major IL online retailers
$336K – $540K/hr
$336K/hr baseline (Gartner 2014); $540K/hr during peak periods (Black Friday). Source: widely verified across ITIC/Gartner
PCI DSS 4.0 R6.4 NIS2 (if "important")
PCI DSS 4.0 Req 6.4: all web-facing apps in CHD scope must be protected by WAF or reviewed by DAST. No explicit DDoS testing frequency.

Gap: PCI DSS validates WAF is present, not that it survives L7 attack. No DDoS simulation requirement exists.
Global benchmark
55 – 72
Detected (passive)
21 – 26
→
Est. upper bound
28 – 42
On-demand scrubbing activated during peak seasons is not passively visible.
2–10% CDN on primary domains; apex and online-ordering subdomains frequently on bare hosting. All below the 55–72 sector benchmark.
DDactic passive scan Oct 2026 · OPI v1.1.0
No compliance clause mandates DDoS testing. Organizations find out during an attack. Peak DDoS risk coincides with peak revenue -- the worst possible moment to discover a gap.
Discover the gap during the attack, not before
SaaS / Technology
Global SaaS firms HQ'd in IL
$5,600/min baseline
Gartner 2014 cross-industry average. SaaS-specific: SLA breach penalties multiply actual cost; no sector-specific update found
SOC 2 Availability ISO 27001 A.17 NIS2 (digital infra)
SOC 2 Availability criterion (CC9.1): entity monitors capacity and maintains availability. No DDoS simulation required -- only controls and monitoring. ISO 27001 Annex A.17.1: business continuity planning.

Gap: SOC 2 auditors accept "CDN deployed" as evidence. Simulation against the CDN is never asked for.
Global benchmark
55 – 78
Detected (passive)
26 – 50
→
Est. upper bound
35 – 62
AWS Shield Advanced and Azure DDoS Standard are indistinguishable from standard tiers passively.
Best-in-set reaches ~65% CDN (enterprise stack); the weakest runs ~14% CDN across a 400+ asset surface. Large surfaces, thin coverage -- SOC 2 availability attested while the attack surface stays wide open.
DDactic passive scan Oct 2026 · OPI v1.1.0
SOC 2 Type II is the gatekeeper for enterprise SaaS sales. A prospect asks "are you SOC 2 compliant?" and takes that as DDoS assurance. It isn't. The availability criterion has no attack simulation component.
SOC 2 availability ≠ attack survivability
Healthcare & Public Sector
Healthcare
IL HMOs & hospitals
~$474K/hr
Ponemon: $7,900/min healthcare IT downtime. Cyber incident (availability) avg cost: $1.3M/event (Ponemon 2023)
HIPAA §164.308(a)(7) NIS2 Art. 21 MoH Circular 31/2023
HIPAA §164.308(a)(7): contingency plan for system availability (ePHI). Availability under attack is implied but no DDoS testing mandated. NIS2 fills gap for EU-linked entities. IL MoH Circular requires incident reporting only.

Gap: HIPAA budget goes to confidentiality (encryption, access control). Availability under attack is the unfunded mandate.
Global benchmark
35 – 50
Detected (passive)
~44
→
Est. upper bound
50 – 60
Incomplete scan -- larger HMOs not yet fully computed. Estimates carry higher uncertainty.
~58% CDN on a limited surface. Ransomware increasingly uses DDoS as a pressure lever -- HIPAA-equivalent controls don't address it.
DDactic passive scan Aug 2026 · OPI v1.1.0 (incomplete)
Ransomware groups use DDoS as secondary pressure during extortion. A patient portal going down during a mass-casualty event has life-safety implications. HIPAA focuses on breach, not availability under attack -- the wrong threat model for 2026.
Ransomware uses DDoS as a pressure lever -- HIPAA ignores it
Government / Public Sector
National portal + ministries
No verified figure
No sector-specific study found. ITIC enterprise median ($300K/hr) as rough proxy; political/reputational cost not capturable
NIS2 Art. 21 ISO 27001 A.17 INCD Directive
NIS2 Art. 21(2) includes government entities. INCD Directive mandates reporting DDoS attacks on government assets within 6 hours. ISO 27001 A.17: BCM.

Gap: INCD requires REPORTING attacks. No proactive TESTING requirement. 6-hour reporting window only triggers after the attack is already successful.
Global benchmark
30 – 55
Detected (passive)
38
→
Est. upper bound
45 – 58
INCD-mandated contracts likely include on-prem DDoS appliances for the national portal -- not passively detectable.
The unified national portal is protected (~50% CDN). Several major ministry domains resolve to bare hosting at the HTTP level. OpIsrael is the only recurring 'test' -- and its date is announced in advance.
DDactic passive scan Oct 2026 · OPI v1.1.0 (portal only)
Procurement cycles prevent rapid security upgrades. "OpIsrael fire drill" is the only real test -- but it's annual, announced, and teaches them to tighten temporarily. A structured DDoS resilience test would break this pattern.
OpIsrael is the only "test" -- and they know the date
No Regulatory Mandate
Gaming / Entertainment
IL gaming & entertainment
$25K – $400K/hr
Corero/industry research; high-end for major platforms during peak events. "$15M/hr Blizzard" widely cited but unsourced -- excluded
No DDoS mandate PCI DSS (if payments)
No sector-specific DDoS testing requirement. PCI DSS applies only to cardholder-data environments. GDPR Art. 32 for EU players (availability as security measure, not explicitly DDoS).

Gap: Entirely business-motivated. DDoS protection budgeted only after an attack or player churn event.
Global benchmark
50 – 70
Detected (passive)
33 – 61
→
Est. upper bound
42 – 68
Gaming operators commonly run on-demand scrubbing contracts activated under attack.
Widest spread in IL: best-covered ~94% CDN on a compact surface; the largest surface protects only its marketing tier (~29% CDN). L4 volumetric defense is mature; L7 against in-game APIs and payment flows is the blind spot.
DDactic passive scan Oct 2026 · OPI v1.1.0
No regulatory hook exists here -- this is a pure business case. The angle: L4 volumetric protection is strong (game servers are DDoS veterans), but L7 attacks against in-game APIs and payment flows are underprotected and growing.
L4 veterans, L7 blind spots

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